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Abstract This	article	argues	that	high	levels	of	state	capacity	are	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	 consolidating	 autocratic	 rule.	 Rather,	 whether	 non-democratic	 rulers	 can	harness	the	infrastructural	power	of	the	state	to	implement	strategies	of	regime	stabilization	depends	on	three	crucial	 factors:	 the	state’s	social	embedding,	 the	international	context,	and	the	extent	of	elite	cohesion.	The	paper	develops	this	argument	 through	 a	 case	 study	 of	 the	 military-bureaucratic	 regime	 in	 South	Korea	(1961-1987),	which	–	despite	a	high-capacity	‘developmental’	state	at	its	disposal	–	failed	to	maintain	high	levels	of	resilience.		
	Introduction 
 Generally	 speaking,	 state	 capacity	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	 implement	official	policy	goals	–	is	a	function	of	both	the	state’s	infrastructural	power	and	the	 state’s	 external	 embedding,	 such	 as	 the	 social	 (e.g.	 Migdal,	 1988)	 or	international	context	(e.g.	Weiss,	2005).	Existing	studies	that	explore	the	effect	of	 state	 capacity	 on	 the	 resilience	 of	 authoritarian	 regimes	 (e.g.	 Slater	 and	Fenner,	2011;	Andersen	et	al.,	2014;	Seeberg,	2014)	tend	to	focus	primarily	on	the	 infrastructural	 component	 of	 state	 capacity,	 thus	 ignoring	 the	‘embeddedness’	part	of	the	capacity	function.	However,	 as	 this	 paper	 will	 show,	 incorporating	 the	 state’s	 external	embedding	 is	 crucial	 if	we	want	 to	 further	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 capacity-resilience	link.	Specifically,	the	paper	will	argue	that	a	regime’s	ability	to	use	the	state	as	an	instrument	for	consolidating	non-democratic	rule	depends,	first,	on	a	number	of	societal	factors	–	in	particular,	society’s	ability	to	organize	collective	action.	 Second,	 regimes	 can	 be	 inhibited	 in	 their	 use	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 non-democratic	‘weapon’	by	international	factors,	such	as	global	economic	crises	and	external	 power	 relations.	 Finally,	 the	 paper	 will	 demonstrate	 that,	 when	contextual	 factors	 undercut	 the	 infrastructural	 power	 of	 the	 state,	 this	 can	provoke	factional	divisions	within	the	regime,	which,	 in	turn,	can	make	 it	even	more	difficult	to	harness	the	state’s	infrastructural	power	for	regime-stabilizing	purposes.	The	paper	will	make	these	arguments	primarily	through	a	case	study	of	the	military-bureaucratic	regime	that	ruled	South	Korea	(Korea	hereafter)	between	1961	 and	 1987.	 The	 case	 of	 Korea	 can	 be	 highly	 instructive	 to	 identify	 the	
	contextual	factors	that	may	affect	a	regime’s	ability	to	employ	the	state	towards	political	 ends:	 even	 though	 the	 regime	 had	 available	 a	 state	 that	 closely	resembled	 the	 ideal	 type	 of	what	 is	 the	 high-capacity	 state	par	excellence,	 the	‘developmental’	 state,	 resilience	dropped	significantly	 in	 the	 final	 stages	of	 the	regime’s	lifespan.1	That	is	to	say,	we	can	safely	assume	that	the	decline	in	regime	resilience	was	mainly	due,	not	to	failures	in	the	infrastructural	setup	of	the	state,	but	to	changes	in	the	state’s	contextual	embedding.			
The state as a regime tool: the importance of the contextual embedding 
 When	 seeking	 to	 consolidate	 their	 power,	 autocratic	 regimes	 can	 rely	 on	 a	number	 of	 strategies.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 they	 can	 aim	 to	 generate	 legitimation	among	 the	 population,	 quell	 demands	 for	 political	 change	 through	 repressive	
means,	 and	 ‘buy’	 the	 loyalty	 of	 potential	 and	 actual	 opponents	 through	 the	mechanism	of	 co-optation	 (Gerschewski	 2013).	 To	 implement	 these	 strategies,	autocratic	 regimes	 can	 rely	 either	 on	 regime	 organizations	 (such	 as	 political	parties)	 or	 state	 organizations.	 In	 other	 words,	 when	 analyzing	 the	 strategic	repertoire	 of	 non-democratic	 rulers,	 we	 need	 to	 distinguish	 between	 regime	capacity	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 state	 capacity	 on	 the	 other	 (see	 Hanson	 in	 this	special	issue	for	a	more	in-depth	discussion).	The	subsequent	analysis	will	focus	primarily	on	the	latter.		The	 argument	 that	 state	 capacity,	 in	 its	 different	 dimensions,	 helps	dictators	 to	 implement	 strategies	 for	 regime	 stabilization	 has	 been	made	 by	 a	number	 of	 scholars	 (e.g.	 Andersen	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Slater	 and	 Fenner,	 2011).	
	However,	what	is	missing	from	the	relevant	literature	is	an	understanding	of	the	intervening	 factors	 that	 affect	 the	 link	 between	 state	 capacity	 and	 regime	resilience.	Specifically,	there	is	little	appreciation	for	the	fact	that	a	state’s	ability	to	 implement	 strategies	 for	 autocratic	 regime	 survival	 depends	 on	 the	 state’s	social	embedding	and	the	international	context.	This	section,	by	borrowing	from	different	 literatures,	will	 theorize	 about	 some	 of	 these	 factors	 before	we	 then	proceed	to	apply	the	resulting	analytical	framework	to	the	case	of	South	Korea.	Starting	with	 the	 first	 regime	 strategy	 (legitimation),	 state	 capacity	 is,	 in	theory,	most	significant	for	a	regime’s	ability	to	generate	 ‘specific	support’	–	 in	particular,	 the	 ability	 ‘to	 address	 popular	 demands	 for	 socio-economic	development’	 (Gerschewski,	 2013:	 20).	 Since	 the	 mid-1990s,	 a	 large	 body	 of	literature	has	emerged,	providing	strong	evidence	that	high-capacity	states	are	more	 effective	 at	 promoting	 economic	 growth	 than	 low-capacity	 states	 (e.g.	Evans,	1995;	Kohli,	2004).	More	specifically,	many	of	these	studies	focus	on	the	dimension	 of	 bureaucratic	 quality	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 state	bureaucracy	 is	organized	along	classic	Weberian	principles	of	meritocracy	and	procedural	objectivity,	rather	than	inter-personal	 loyalties	and	obligations	(see	Hanson	 in	 this	 special	 issue).	 The	 general	 argument	 that	 emerges	 is	 that	 only	bureaucracies	 of	 a	 certain	 quality	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 efficiently	 implement	programs	of	industrialization	and	other	development-related	policies.	Based	 on	 this,	 we	 should	 expect	 autocratic	 regimes	 that	 control	 high-quality	 bureaucracies	 to	 be	 in	 a	 strong	 position	 to	 generate	 specific	 support	among	citizens	and	hence	be	more	resilient	than	regimes	that	do	not	command	Weberian	bureaucracies.	However,	contrary	to	these	expectations,	Andersen	et	al.	(2014)	–	in	the	only	systematic	test	of	the	relationship	between	bureaucratic	
	quality	 and	 regime	 stability	 –	 report	 no	 significant	 results.	 Their	 explanation	centers	 around	 the	 trade-off	 that	 autocratic	 rulers	 face	 between	 public	 and	private	goods	provision:	to	keep	themselves	 in	power,	 it	may	be	more	vital	 for	rulers	 to	 distribute	 private	 goods	 to	 elites	 in	 the	 winning	 coalition	 than	 to	produce	 public	 goods	 through	 the	 mechanism	 of	 economic	 development.	Alternatively,	 as	 the	 democratization	 literature	 argues,	 state-led	 growth	 may	undermine	 the	 resilience	 of	 autocratic	 polities	 by	 one	 of	 the	 two	 following	mechanisms:	by	causing	significant	shifts	in	the	balance	of	power	between	social	classes	(e.g.	Bernhard,	2016)	or	by	provoking	a	change	in	mass	political	culture	from	survival	to	emancipative	values	(Welzel,	2013).	Regarding	the	second	regime	strategy	(repression),	studies	have	produced	substantial	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 state	 capacity	 increases	 the	 durability	 of	autocratic	 rule	 (e.g.	 Bellin,	 2004;	 Andersen	 et	 al,.	 2014).	 In	 particular,	 these	studies	 have	 employed	 the	dimension	of	 coercive	capacity	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 state’s	ability	 to	maintain	 internal	order	and	obtain	compliance	 from	citizens	–	as	 the	independent	 variable.	 As	 Slater	 and	 Fenner	 (2011:	 20)	 explain,	 an	 effective	coercive	 state	 apparatus	 not	 only	 equips	 dictators	 with	 general	 ‘crackdown	capacity’,	but	it	also	allows	for	violence	to	be	deployed	in	a	controlled	way,	thus	avoiding	 disproportionately	 bloody	 engagements	 that	 could	 spark	 rather	 than	suppress	opposition.	However,	not	all	regime-sponsored	coercion	is	of	the	‘high	intensity’	type	(Levitsky	and	Way,	2010:	57-59),	regimes	may	also	resort	to	‘low	intensity’	 coercion	 –	 that	 is,	more	 subtle	 practices	 of	 physical	 harassment	 and	intimidation,	 such	 as	 denying	 opposition	 members	 certain	 employment	opportunities	 or	 targeting	 them	 for	 tax	 inspections.	 Such	 forms	 of	 soft	
	repression,	 then,	may	depend	more	on	 the	state’s	administrative	capacity	 than	its	coercive	capacity	(Seeberg,	2014:	1271).	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 important	 to	be	aware	of	 the	risks	and	 limitations	that	dictators	 face	when	 using	 repression	 as	 a	 survival	 strategy.	Most	 importantly,	overreliance	 on	 repression	makes	 dictators	 vulnerable	 to	military	 coups,	 as	 a	pivotal	military	 is	 likely	 to	misuse	 its	 position	 to	 thrust	 itself	 into	 power	 (e.g.	Croissant	 and	 Kuehn,	 2015).	 Moreover,	 the	 international	 context	 may	 also	impose	 a	 constraint	 on	 the	 regime’s	 ability	 to	 employ	 coercive	 power:	 where	linkage	 to	 the	West	–	 for	example,	economic	or	 intergovernmental	 linkage	–	 is	high,	abuses	of	power	 ‘routinely	gain	 international	attention	and	 trigger	costly	punitive	action’	(Levitsky	and	Way,	2010:	53).	Finally,	 regarding	 the	 strategy	 of	 co-optation,	 scholars	 have	 emphasized	the	 importance	of	nominally	democratic	 institutions	–	elections,	 in	particular	–	to	 explain	 the	 stability	 of	 autocratic	 rule	 (see	 Croissant	 and	Hellmann,	 2016).	Elections,	it	has	been	argued,	perform	a	variety	of	functions	in	tying	strategically	relevant	 elites	 to	 the	 regime	 (see	 Gandhi	 and	 Lust-Okar,	 2009).	 Most	importantly,	 regular	electoral	 contests	provide	dictators	with	a	mechanism	 for	making	 a	 credible	 commitment	 not	 to	 expropriate	 domestic	 investment,	distributing	patronage	and	other	spoils,	and	–	by	mobilizing	supermajorities	of	voters	–	signaling	to	potential	challengers	that	opposition	to	the	regime	is	futile.	Theoretically,	the	state	may	play	an	important	role	in	helping	dictators	win	elections.	For	one,	dictators	can	use	state	structures	to	establish	what	Magaloni	(2006)	 calls	 a	 clientelistic	 ‘punishment	 regime’	 whereby	 access	 to	 public	resources,	 such	 as	 social	 policy	 schemes	 or	 public	 sector	 employment,	 is	 only	made	 available	 to	 supporters	 of	 the	 regime	 party.	 Such	 state-dependent,	
	clientelistic	mobilization	strategies	are	not	available	to	opposition	parties,	 thus	giving	 the	 regime	 a	 significant	 competitive	 advantage.	 In	 addition,	 the	 regime	can	use	the	state	apparatus	to	organize	the	systematic	manipulation	of	elections	–	either	before,	during,	or	after	the	voting	takes	place	(e.g.	Seeberg,	2014:	1271;	Seeberg	and	van	Ham	in	this	special	issue).	Having	 established	 a	 theoretical	 link	 between	 state	 capacity	 and	 co-optation,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 again	 outline	 possible	 structural	 constraints	 that	dictators	may	face.	To	begin	with,	the	effectiveness	of	clientelism	as	an	electoral	strategy	hinges	on	two	factors.	First,	clientelism	is	tied	to	there	being	sufficient	public	 resources	 available;	 economic	 crises	 and	 ensuing	 reforms,	 for	 instance,	may	 significantly	 undermine	 the	 stability-inducing	 effects	 of	 clientelistic	punishment	regimes	(e.g.	Greene,	2010).	Second,	more	affluent	voters	generally	tend	 to	be	 less	susceptible	 to	clientelism,	as	 they	are	 less	dependent	on	public	resources	 for	 maintaining	 their	 living	 standards	 (e.g.	 Lyne,	 2007).	 Turning	 to	electoral	 malpractices	 and	 fraud,	 scholars	 have	 identified	 a	 number	 of	concomitant	 risks	 that	 can	 pose	 a	 potential	 threat	 to	 regime	 stability.	 Most	importantly,	 electoral	 fraud	 may	 trigger	 destabilizing	 protests	 over	 ‘stolen’	elections	 –	 in	 particular,	 if	 manipulations	 are	 clumsily	 executed	 and	 if	 the	opposition	cooperates	in	organizing	collective	action	(e.g.	Schedler,	2015).	Overall,	 there	 are	 good	 theoretical	 reasons	 why	 we	 should	 expect	 state	capacity	–	measured	along	the	dimensions	of	bureaucratic	quality	and	coercive	authority	–	to	enhance	the	stability	of	autocratic	rule.	Not	only	do	high-capacity	states	 provide	 dictators	 with	 the	 means	 to	 generate	 specific	 support	 at	 the	output-side	of	the	political	system,	but	they	also	help	dictators	retain	control	of	the	 input-side	 of	 the	 political	 system,	 especially	 by	 putting	 them	 in	 charge	 of	
	efficient	instruments	of	repression	and	electoral	mobilization.	At	the	same	time,	however,	 the	 preceding	 section	 suggested	 that	whether	 autocratic	 leaders	 are	able	 to	 use	 the	 state	 towards	 these	 strategic	 ends	 depends	 ultimately	 on	 the	state’s	social	embedding	and	the	international	context.	
 
 
Korea’s developmental state: origins and features 	Academic	 studies	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	developmental	 state	 in	Korea’s	 process	 of	late	 industrialization	 commonly	 point	 out	 that	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	 coordinate	industrial	 development	was	only	partly	due	 to	 its	 infrastructural	 power.	What	also	mattered	was	the	state’s	‘autonomous	embeddedness’	(Evans	1995)	and	its	institutionalized	 links	with	 a	 highly	 concentrated	business	 sector,	 and	 the	 fact	that	 Western	 capitalist	 countries	 tolerated	 state	 interventionist	 policies	 as	 a	means	to	strengthen	South	Korea	vis-à-vis	the	communist	North.	In	other	words,	scholars	of	Korean	political	economy	have	long	held	an	understanding	that	state	capacity	depended	on	contextual	factors.		In	the	remainder	of	this	article	we	will	make	a	similar	argument	regarding	the	developmental	state’s	capacity	to	keep	Korea’s	military-bureaucratic	regime	in	power.	 In	order	to	do	so,	we	will	 first	outline	the	historical	process	through	which	 the	 developmental	 state	 was	 equipped	with	 infrastructural	 power.	 The	subsequent	 section	 will	 then	 discuss	 how	 contextual	 changes	 made	 it	increasingly	difficult	to	harness	this	power	for	regime	stabilizing	purposes.	Before	tracing	the	infrastructural	evolution	of	Korea’s	developmental	state,	it	is	important	to	note	that	scholars	do	not	agree	on	who	played	the	key	role	in	
	shaping	 this	 process.	 While	 some	 authors	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 Japanese	colonialism	 (e.g.	 Kohli	 1994),	 others	 argue	 that	 colonial	 legacies	 were	 largely	destroyed	 under	 the	 post-WWII	 regime	 of	 Rhee	 Syngman	 (1948-1960)	 and,	instead,	highlight	the	role	of	the	subsequent	Park	Chung-hee	regime	in	building	the	 developmental	 state	 (e.g.	 Haggard	 et	 al.,	 1997).	 Without	 getting	 into	 the	details	of	this	debate,	our	argument	here	is	the	following:	important	institutional	foundations	 remained	 in	 place	 during	 Rhee’s	 rule,	 thus	 giving	 Park	 the	opportunity	to	build	on	these	foundations.		When	the	Japanese	took	possession	of	the	Korean	peninsula,	the	local	state	was	 showing	 signs	 of	 disintegration.	 For	 almost	 five	 centuries,	 the	 Yi	 dynasty	had	ruled	Korea	in	a	highly	patrimonial	fashion,	relying	mainly	the	landowning	
yangban	 class	 to	 exercise	 governmental	 authority	 over	 the	 population.	 Hence,	Japanese	 colonial	 authorities,	 driven	 by	 the	 long-term	 objective	 of	 eventually	integrating	Korea	into	an	expanded	Japan,	immediately	set	out	to	modernize	the	state.	 In	 particular,	 institution	 building	 focused	 on	 three	 different	 areas	 (see	Kohli,	 1994:	 1273-1275).	 First,	 patrimonial	 elements	 of	 the	 monarchial	 state	were	 replaced	 with	 a	 depersonalized,	 hierarchical	 bureaucracy,	 staffed	 by	colonial	 officials	 and	 Japanese-trained	 Korean	 civil	 servants.	 Second,	 the	Japanese	set	up	a	well	organized,	highly	disciplined	police	force.	Third,	not	only	were	 the	 state’s	 bureaucratic	 and	 coercive	 capacities	 strengthened,	 but	 ‘[t]he	new	state	also	achieved	considerable	downward	penetration:	both	the	civil	and	police	bureaucracies	reached	into	the	nooks	and	crannies	of	the	society’	(Kohli,	1994:	1273-1275).	To	achieve	direct	bureaucratic	penetration,	the	yangban	class	was	 incorporated	 into	 local	 governance	 structures,	 not	without,	 however,	 first	subordinating	it	to	the	new	state	through	an	extensive	land	survey.	
	The	end	of	colonial	rule	–	precipitated	by	Japan’s	surrender	in	WWII	–	and	the	division	of	the	Korean	peninsula	along	the	38th	parallel	undoubtedly	marked	a	 critical	 juncture	 in	 the	 process	 of	 state	 building.	 The	 implications	 for	 the	quality	 and	 strength	 of	 state	 institutions	 in	 the	 south	were	mixed.	On	 the	 one	hand,	bureaucratic	 capacity	declined	 considerably.	This	was	mainly	due	 to	 the	fact	 that	 the	 Japanese	 withdrawal	 left	 a	 great	 void	 in	 civil	 service	 personnel,	which	the	US-backed	regime	of	Rhee	Syngman	proceeded	to	fill	with	politically	motivated	 patronage	 appointments,	 rather	 than	 well	 trained	 technocrats	(Haggard	et	al.,	1997:	873).	On	the	other	hand,	in	other	aspects	of	state	building,	the	 Rhee	 regime	 produced	 a	more	 positive	 impact.	 For	 one,	 albeit	 admittedly	under	intense	pressure	from	US	military	authorities	and	facilitated	by	the	social	upheaval	caused	by	the	Korean	War	(1950-53),	the	Rhee	regime	implemented	a	far-reaching	program	of	 land	reform.	In	the	long	run,	 land	reform	would	prove	important	 because,	 by	 considerably	weakening	 the	 yangban	 elite,	 it	 increased	the	autonomy	of	the	state	 from	social	actors,	 thereby	establishing	the	basis	 for	the	 developmental	 state’s	 ability	 to	 coordinate	 and	 carry	 out	 programs	 of	industrial	 transformation	 (Cumings,	 1984).	Moreover,	 under	 the	 Rhee	 regime,	the	state’s	security	organs	also	experienced	a	dramatic	boost	in	capacity.	As	Vu	argues,	 the	 extreme	 ideological	 polarization	 among	political	 elites	 incentivized	the	right-wing	Rhee	regime	to	‘revive	[…]	coercive	institutions,	reorganize	them	under	 Korean	 command,	 test	 them	 in	 battles,	 and	 reorient	 them	 toward	repressing	communism’	(Vu,	2007:	35).	However,	 at	 the	 same	 time	as	heavily	 investing	 in	 the	 state	as	a	 coercive	instrument,	 Rhee	 politicized	 the	 security	 apparatus	 for	 his	 own	 strategic	purposes	 (Huer,	 1989:	 13).	 Critically,	 by	 promoting	 loyal	 supporters	 to	 the	
	highest	 ranks	 of	 the	 officer	 corps	 and	 playing	 off	 rival	 factions	 against	 one	another,	Rhee	succeeded	in	achieving	effective	control	over	the	military,	which	–	fueled	by	US	military	aid	and	the	exigencies	of	the	Korean	War	–	had	emerged	as	the	most	significant	organization	in	the	political	system.	In	particular,	Rhee	used	his	 influence	 over	 high-ranking	 officers	 to	mobilize	military	 units	 as	 voters	 in	elections	 and	 to	 funnel	 public	 funds	 earmarked	 for	military	 purposes	 into	 his	party’s	 coffers.	 Over	 time,	 however,	 Rhee’s	meddling	 in	 the	military’s	 internal	affairs	 was	 met	 with	 increasing	 opposition	 from	 younger	 officers,	 eventually	contributing	to	a	military	coup	under	the	leadership	of	Park	Chung-hee	in	1961.	While,	overall,	Japanese	colonial	rule	and	the	Rhee	regime	had	resulted	in	positive	state	building	outcomes,	it	was	during	the	early	years	of	Park’s	military-bureaucratic	regime	that	Korea’s	developmental	state	was	fully	established.	To	explain	why	the	Park	regime	engaged	 in	reforms	that	pushed	the	Korean	state	towards	the	 ‘developmental’	 type,	scholars	generally	emphasize	the	belligerent	threats	 posed	 by	 North	 Korea	 and	 the	 scarcity	 of	 natural	 resources	 in	 the	southern	 part	 of	 the	Korean	 peninsula	 (e.g.	Woo-Cumings,	 1998;	Doner,	 et	 al.,	2005).	Together,	these	factors	created	incentives	for	the	Park	regime	to	achieve	rapid	 industrialization,	 with	 the	 developmental	 state	 acting	 as	 the	 primary	vehicle	for	transformation.	As	one	of	his	first	priorities,	Park	purged	loyalists	of	the	Rhee	regime	from	the	 military	 leadership	 and	 then	 went	 on	 to	 further	 strengthen	 the	 coercive	capacities	of	the	state.	Most	significantly,	only	a	 few	weeks	after	taking	charge,	the	new	regime	set	up	 the	Korean	Central	 Intelligence	Agency	(KCIA),	which	–	equipped	 with	 far-reaching	 authority	 and	 placed	 directly	 under	 presidential	control	–	would	become	‘Park’s	favorite	instrument	of	power’	(Kim,	2011:	144).	
	Equally	important	for	the	state	building	process,	if	not	more	so,	was	the	regime’s	decision	 to	 reestablish	 the	 bureaucracy	 on	 Weberian	 principles	 of	 public	administration	–	in	particular,	by	restoring	the	haengsi	(administrative	entrance	examination)	system	and	by	establishing	a	Ministry	of	Government	(MGA)	that	was	 tasked	 with	 ensuring	 that	 promotions	 would	 be	 merit-based	 (Kim	 H.-A	2011:	 93-94).	However,	 it	 should	be	pointed	out	 that,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	many	holders	 of	 top	 bureaucratic	 positions	 were	 recruited	 from	 among	 the	 armed	forces,	 thus	 leading	 to	 a	 closely	 interwoven	 relationship	 between	 the	military	and	the	civil	service	(Yang	1999:	520-521).	Finally,	another	important	piece	in	the	construction	of	the	developmental	state	 was	 the	 centralization	 of	 economic	 decision-making	 in	 a	 powerful	Economic	 Planning	 Board	 (EPB).	 Staffed	 with	 highly	 trained	 technocrats,	 and	bestowed	with	 the	power	 to	 independently	 raise	capital	 for	 industrial	projects	through	foreign	 loans	and	 investments,	 the	EPB	would	move	on	to	become	the	key	pilot	agency	responsible	for	coordinating	Korea’s	economic	transformation	(e.g.	Cheng	et	al.,	1998).	Once	 put	 in	 place	 in	 the	 early	 1960s,	 the	 institutional	 properties	 of	 the	Korean	 developmental	 state	 remained	 largely	 unchanged	 under	 both	 the	 Park	Chung-hee	 (1961-1979)	 and	Chun	Doo-hwan	 (1979-1988)	governments.	What	
did	 change	 was	 the	 context	 into	 which	 the	 state	 was	 embedded.	 As	 will	 be	discussed	 in	 the	next	section,	 it	was	 these	changes	 that	explain	why	 it	became	increasingly	difficult	to	use	the	developmental	state	as	a	regime-stabilizing	tool.	
 
 
The decline of state capacity: domestic and international drivers 
	 After	 the	 structures	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 had	been	 institutionalized,	 the	military-bureaucratic	 regime	used	 these	 structures	 to	 implement	an	ambitious	program	 of	 industrial	 transformation.	 Yet,	 even	 though	 the	 program	 was	 a	success	(in	economic	terms),	the	aggressive	way	in	which	it	was	put	into	effect,	meant	 that	 economic	 growth	 failed	 to	 translate	 into	 specific	 (output-oriented)	legitimation	for	the	regime.	 Instead,	 from	the	 late	1970s	onwards,	 the	growing	middle	and	working	classes	began	to	oppose	the	regime	in	a	more	coordinated	fashion.	These	social	changes,	in	turn,	had	significant	implications	for	the	state’s	capacity	 to	 implement	 the	 regime’s	 strategies	 of	 power	 consolidation.	Specifically,	 the	 state’s	 repressive	 capacity	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 capacity	 to	 obtain	compliance	 from	 citizens	 through	 coercive	means	 –	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 generate	electoral	 support	 declined	 dramatically.	 What	 is	 more,	 a	 strategic	 shift	 in	 US	foreign	 policy	 in	 the	 early	 1980s	 prevented	 the	 regime	 from	 operating	 the	developmental	 state	 at	 full	 (infrastructural)	 power,	 thus	 further	 reducing	 the	level	of	state	capacity.		
Legitimation The	 story	 of	 how	 Korea’s	 developmental	 state	 coordinated	industrialization	 and	 successfully	 promoted	 economic	 growth	 has	 been	 told	many	 times	(e.g.	Amsden,	1989;	Kohli,	2004).	Hence,	here,	 it	 suffices	 to	briefly	summarize	the	key	points.	Essentially,	a	number	of	interventionist	instruments	(restrictions	on	foreign	trade,	government	monopoly	on	the	provision	of	credit,	corporatist	 control	 of	 trade	 unions)	 helped	 the	 developmental	 state	 to	deliberately	 get	 the	 prices	 ‘wrong’	 and	 create	 other	 incentives	 for	 private	
	business	 to	 move	 into	 strategically	 targeted	 markets.	 However,	 centrally	coordinated	 industrialization	 plans	 were	 not	 implemented	 in	 a	 linear	 fashion	but,	 repeatedly,	 the	 EPB	 had	 to	 adjust	 plans	 to	 respond	 to	 unexpected	 events	and	conditions.	Soon	after	taking	power,	the	Park	regime,	viewing	the	import-substitution	development	strategy	adopted	under	Rhee	Syngman	as	a	 failure,	switched	to	a	strategy	of	export-oriented	 industrialization	 that	 focused	on	 low-skilled,	 labor-intensive	manufactured	goods	such	as	 textiles,	 toys,	 and	consumer	electronics.		However,	the	success	of	the	export-oriented	industrialization	program	soon	led	to	a	shortage	of	skilled	workers,	which	–	 in	combination	with	rising	 inflation	–	caused	 a	 sharp	 rise	 in	 real	 wages.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 in	 the	 early	 1970s,	 the	regime	decided	 to	push	 into	 a	 new	niche	 in	 the	world	 economy	by	promoting	heavy	and	chemical	 industries	 such	as	 iron	and	steel,	 shipbuilding,	machinery,	electronics,	and	petrochemical	processing.		The	 next	 crisis	 struck	with	 the	 second	 ‘oil	 shock’	 in	 1979,	which	 dealt	 a	heavy	 blow	 to	 the	 government’s	 program	 of	 heavy	 industrialization.	Consequently,	 and	 also	 partly	 due	 to	 the	 assassination	 of	 Park	 Chung-hee	 in	October	(see	‘Repression’	section	below)	and	a	disastrous	agricultural	harvest	in	the	same	year,	 the	Korean	economy	plunged	 into	a	recession	and	accumulated	staggering	 levels	 of	 foreign	 debt.	 The	 successive	 regime	 leadership	 reacted	 to	this	slump	with	a	careful	deregulation	of	 the	market,	and	a	series	of	 fiscal	and	budgetary	measures	aimed	at	restoring	macroeconomic	stability.	Nevertheless,	despite	these	crises,	the	program	of	 industrialization	led	by	the	 developmental	 state	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	 military-bureaucratic	 regime	delivered	staggering	results,	as	reflected,	 for	example,	 in	the	fact	that,	between	
	1961	and	1987,	the	Korean	economy	grew	at	an	average	annual	rate	of	over	nine	percent	 (see	Figure	1),	 lifting	GDP	per	 capita	 from	156	US	dollars	 to	3,628	US	dollars.	
 [Figure	1	about	here.]	
 Notwithstanding	 these	 breathtaking	 macroeconomic	 figures,	 state-led	industrialization	 failed	 to	 generate	 specific	 regime	 legitimation	 among	 the	population,	 the	main	 reason	 being	 that	 Park	 Chung-hee’s	 approach	 of	 ‘growth	first	and	distribution	later’	resulted	in	pronounced	socio-economic	inequalities.	‘[E]xport-led	 industrialization’,	 as	 Im	 explains,	 ‘transformed	 what	 once	 [had	been]	a	homogenous	society,	living	in	a	condition	of	‘equality-in-poverty’,	into	a	heterogeneous	class	society,	with	a	rising	income	gap	between	capital	and	labor,	urban	and	countryside	areas,	and	Chŏlla	and	Kyŏngsang	provinces’	(2011:	244).	However,	it	was	not	just	the	losers	of	industrialization	–	the	rural	population	and	the	working	class	–	who	denied	the	regime’s	legitimacy,	but	the	growing	middle	class	was	also	‘extremely	dissatisfied	with	the	authoritarian	political	system	and	with	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 benefits	 of	 economic	 growth	 had	 been	 distributed’	(Koo,	1991:	490).	While	the	regime	was	able	to	‘buy’	the	support	of	the	rural	population	(see	‘Co-optation’	 section),	 workers	 and	 parts	 of	 the	 middle	 class	 voiced	 their	grievances	 not	 only	 through	 voting	 but	 also	 through	 the	 mechanism	 of	 mass	protest.	Sporadic	labor	unrest	first	flared	up	in	the	late	1960s,	when	the	crisis	of	the	 low-skilled,	 export-oriented	 manufacturing	 sectors	 galvanized	 workers’	grievances.2	At	 the	 same	 time,	 labor	 issues	 were	 also	 taken	 up	 by	 the	 main	
	opposition	party,	the	New	Democratic	Party	(NDP),	which	arguably	contributed	to	its	strong	performance	in	both	the	parliamentary	and	presidential	elections	in	1971.	 To	 make	 things	 worse	 for	 the	 Park	 regime,	 that	 same	 year	 also	 saw	unprecedented	 student	 protests	 –	most	 notably	 against	 the	 Student	 Corps	 for	National	Defense	 (SCND),	which	 the	government	had	 introduced	 to	 implement	military	training	programs	on	university	campuses.	The	response	of	the	regime	was	to	escalate	the	methods	of	repression	(see	below),	which,	however,	failed	to	uproot	the	underlying	causes	of	social	protest.	In	 particular,	 the	 burden	 of	 the	 newly	 implemented	 program	 of	 heavy	industrialization	was	again	placed	on	the	back	of	 the	working	class,	with	wage	increases	 lagging	 behind	 productivity	 increases	 throughout	 the	 1970s	 (Deyo,	1987:	197).	Moreover,	as	grievances	persisted,	the	organizational	capacity	of	the	working	 class	 increased	 significantly	 –	 for	 two	main	 reasons	 (see	 Koo,	 1993:	139-141).	First,	heavy	industrialization	led	to	a	concentration	of	factory	workers	in	 large	 units	 of	 production,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 helped	 create	 working	 class	communities.	 Second,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 independent	 trade	 unions,	 church	groups	and	students	came	to	play	a	significant	role	in	raising	workers’	collective	consciousness.	As	a	result,	over	time,	labor	activism	became	more	assertive	and	larger	in	scale.	 This	 not	 only	 played	 a	 part	 in	 Park	 Chung-hee’s	 downfall	 in	 1979,	 but,	more	fundamentally,	equipped	the	pro-democracy	minjung	movement	with	the	means	 to	 assert	 increasing	 pressure	 on	 the	 military-bureaucratic	 regime	 –	reflected	 in	 the	 rise	of	organized	protest	 in	 the	 late	1970s	and	mid-1980s.3	As	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section,	regime	elites	became	increasingly	divided	over	 the	question	of	how	to	react	 to	 the	growing	strength	of	civil	society,	with	
	soft-liner	 factions	 –	 assisted	by	 the	 international	 context	 –	 eventually	winning	the	power	struggle	and	putting	Korea	on	the	path	to	democratization.	In	short,	although	state	capacity	helped	the	military-bureaucratic	regime	to	successfully	 implement	 programs	 of	 industrial	 transformation,	 the	 resulting	economic	 growth	 did	 not	 translate	 into	 specific	 legitimation.	 In	 particular,	 the	growing	 working	 and	 middle	 classes	 –	 motivated	 by	 grievances	 over	 social	injustice	–	withheld	their	support	for	the	regime.		
 
Repression As	 outlined	 above,	 Park	 Chung-hee	 inherited	 a	 state	 with	 tremendous	coercive	capacity	from	earlier	regimes.	After	taking	power,	Park	took	immediate	measures	to	further	strengthen	the	state’s	repressive	instruments.	Not	only	did	he	 establish	 the	KCIA,	 but	he	 also	bolstered	 rival	 surveillance	 agencies	 –	most	notably,	the	Presidential	Security	Service	and	the	Army	Security	Command	–	to	keep	 the	 KCIA	 in	 check	 (Kim	B.-K.,	 2011:	 144).	 Park	 used	 the	 state’s	 coercive	apparatus	 extensively	 to	 apply	 repression	 against	 (potentially)	 disloyal	 elites	and	 opposition	 movements.	 However,	 eventually,	 the	 over-reliance	 on	repressive	 mechanisms	 backfired,	 ending	 in	 his	 assassination	 by	 the	 KCIA	director	 in	 1979.	The	 successive	 regime	of	 Chun	Doo-hwan	maintained	 (if	 not	raised)	 the	 level	 of	 repression,	 yet	 became	 increasingly	 constrained	 in	 its	options	 by	 the	 geopolitical	 context	 and	 US	 pressure.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 by	strengthening	 the	 soft-liners	 among	 the	 ruling	 elites,	 heralded	 the	 end	 of	 the	military-bureaucratic	regime.	In	the	early	years	of	the	regime,	after	suspending	political	parties	and	civil	liberties	 in	 1961,	 the	 greatest	 threat	 for	 Park	 Chung-hee	 came	 from	 other	
	military	officers.	At	the	time	of	the	coup,	the	armed	forces	were	divided	into	two	main	 factions:	 the	 so-called	 Northern	 faction,	 consisting	 primarily	 of	 senior	officers	 with	 North	 Korean	 and	 Manchurian	 backgrounds,	 and	 a	 faction	 of	younger	officers	around	Park	Chung-hee	and	Kim	Jong-pil	(Huer,	1989:	69-71).	The	division	between	these	two	factions	exploded	into	open	conflict,	when,	after	having	announced	 the	 reintroduction	of	 elections	 for	1963,	Park	declared	 that	he	intended	to	run	as	a	presidential	candidate.	Moreover,	it	became	evident	that	Kim	Jong-pil	had	been	secretly	working	on	establishing	a	political	party,	thus	–	given	the	general	ban	on	political	associations	–	providing	Park	with	a	significant	competitive	 advantage	 vis-à-vis	 other	 elites.	 Taken	 together,	 the	 leaders	 of	Northern	 faction	 read	 these	 developments	 as	 a	 grab	 for	 power	 and	 publicly	demanded	for	Park	to	step	down.	Park,	on	his	part,	responded	with	a	crackdown	(‘Operation	 Alaska’),	 purging	 Northern	 leaders	 from	 key	 positions	 and	 thus	destroying	 the	 faction	 (Kim	 H.-A,	 2011:	 110).	 This	move	 installed	 Park’s	 own	circle	of	followers,	the	Hanahoe	(Group	One),	as	the	dominant	faction	within	the	military.	The	 next	 challenge	 to	 Park’s	 rule	 came	 in	 1969	 when	 Park	 sought	 a	constitutional	 revision	 to	 remove	 the	 two-term	 limit	 for	 the	 presidency.	 This	move	met	with	 resistance	 from	 two	 sides:	 Kim	 Jong-pil,	who	 had	 always	 seen	himself	as	Park’s	rightful	successor,	and	the	so-called	 ‘Gang	of	Four’	within	the	DRP,	 which	 –	 lacking	 the	 charisma	 and	 mass	 support	 base	 of	 Kim	 Jong-pil	 –	hoped	 to	 install	 a	 parliamentary	 system	 after	 Park’s	 last	 term	 in	 office.	 Park	followed	a	two-pronged	strategy	to	break	down	the	resistance:	instruct	the	KCIA	to	bully	Kim	Jong-pil	and	his	 ‘crown	prince’	faction	with	threats	of	a	purge	and	have	the	DRP	Finance	Chairman	sweet-talk	the	‘Gang	of	Four’	into	acquiescence.	
	After	the	constitutional	amendment	was	passed,	however,	the	KCIA	also	struck	against	 the	 latter,	 with	 the	 effect	 of	 removing	 the	 ‘Gang	 of	 Four’	 from	 the	political	 power	 game	 (Kim	 B.-K.,	 2011:	 144-145).	 Overall,	 these	 repressive	measures	 meant	 that	 ‘[t]he	 ruling	 DRP	 was	 transformed	 from	 a	 coalition	 of	loyalist	party	bosses	to	a	system	of	one-man	rule	without	independent	bosses	by	October	1971’	(Im,	2011:	242).		Yet,	while	Park	Chung-hee	had	thus	succeeded	in	containing	the	risks	of	an	elite-led	 palace	 coup,	 he	 was	 now	 –	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 ‘Legitimation’	 section	above	 –	 confronted	with	 a	 growing	wave	 of	 social	 unrest.	 Park	 responded	 by	stepping	 up	 repression	 measures.	 To	 begin	 with,	 he	 ordered	 the	 violent	crackdown	 on	 workers’	 strikes	 and	 student	 demonstrations.	 Moreover,	preceded	by	the	proclamation	of	a	state	of	emergency	and	the	enactment	of	the	Special	Law	for	National	Security	in	December	1971,	Park	implemented	the	so-called	 Yushin	 constitution	 in	 October	 1972,	 which	 closed	 the	 space	 for	organizing	protest	and	tightened	the	state’s	control	over	labor.	However,	 these	 institutional	 measures	 aimed	 at	 centralizing	 the	 control	over	the	state’s	coercive	 instruments	meant	that	 ‘[t]he	way	Park	employed	the	strategy	 of	 repression	 became	 more	 clumsy	 […]	 as	 he	 lost	 the	 vigilance,	discipline,	and	system	of	checks	and	balances	that	had	served	him	so	well	during	the	 1960s’	 (Kim	 B.-K.,	 2011:	 166).	 Eventually,	 Park’s	 increasingly	 arbitrary	exercise	 of	 coercive	 power	 provoked	 a	 split	 among	 regime	 elites.	 The	 specific	trigger	 for	 this	 split	 was	 the	 spread	 of	 student	 protests	 across	 university	campuses	 in	 the	 cities	 of	 Pusan	 and	 Masan	 in	 October	 1979.4	While	 Park,	supported	by	the	head	of	the	presidential	guard,	again	sought	to	resort	to	violent	suppression	 as	 a	 strategic	 measure,	 the	 director	 of	 the	 KCIA,	 Kim	 Jae-kyu,	
	opposed	coercive	measures,	believing	that	this	would	only	fuel	further	protests	and	 escalate	 the	 situation.	 Under	 the	 mistaken	 assumption	 that	 he	 had	 the	support	of	key	factions	 in	the	military,	Kim	shot	both	Park	and	the	head	of	the	presidential	guard	on	October	26.	What	ensued	was	week-long	political	 chaos,	with	order	only	restored	through	a	coup	under	the	leadership	of	General	Chun	Doo-hwan	–	a	key	figure	in	the	dominant	Hanahoe	faction.	Initially,	the	Chun	regime	maintained	a	similar	level	of	repression	as	Park,	illustrated	most	starkly	by	 the	new	 leadership’s	response	 to	an	uprising	 in	 the	southwestern	 city	 of	 Kwangju	 in	May	 1980,	which	 left	 hundreds	 of	 protesters	dead.	However,	starting	in	1984,	Chun	–	seeking	a	stronger	base	of	legitimacy	–	began	to	engage	in	a	carefully	calibrated	liberalization	of	the	political	system.	As	briefly	 touched	 upon	 earlier,	 civil	 society	 movements	 used	 this	 opening	 of	participatory	space	to	intensify	their	attacks	against	autocratic	rule.	Not	only	did	worker	 militancy	 surge	 significantly	 after	 the	 initiation	 of	 yuhwa	 kookmyun	(decompression	phase)	–	as	reflected	in	the	rise	of	labor	disputes	from	98	cases	in	 1983	 to	 265	 cases	 in	 1985	 (Koo,	 1993:	 151)	 –	 but	 the	 newly	 created	opposition	party,	 the	New	Korea	Democratic	Party	 (NKDP),	 also	began	 to	 take	the	fight	against	the	regime	to	the	street.		With	 opposition	 groups	 growing	 stronger,	 the	 regime	 had	 to	 decide	whether	 to	 continue	 the	 process	 of	 liberalization	 or	 to	 reverse	 the	 process	through	violent	means.	 It	was	 at	 this	point	 that	 inter-factional	 rivalries	within	the	 military	 came	 to	 the	 surface.	 Since	 Park’s	 death,	 the	 division	 between	Hanahoe	and	non-Hanahoe	members	had	deepened	significantly,	with	the	latter	growing	 increasingly	 frustrated	over	 the	 fact	 that	 high-ranking	positions	were	only	available	to	Hanahoe	members.	Fueled	by	their	grievances	over	the	lack	of	
	opportunities	 for	career	advancement,	non-Hanahoe	officers	–	who	constituted	the	majority	in	the	office	corps	–	began	developing	an	interest	in	political	change	and	 started	 to	oppose	 coercive	 action	 against	 anti-government	protesters	 (e.g.	Kim,	2012).	Crucially,	 the	 international	 context	 at	 the	 time	 favored	 the	 non-Hanahoe	officers.	Of	particular	importance	was	the	role	of	the	United	States:	whereas	the	Carter	 government	 –	 seeking	 to	 avoid	 potentially	 destabilizing	 foreign-policy	decisions	after	the	Iran	hostage	crisis	in	1979	–	had	silently	tolerated	the	violent	crackdown	 on	 the	 Kwangju	 uprising	 in	 1980,	 the	 Reagan	 administration	 –	buoyed	by	the	success	of	the	democracy	movement	in	the	Philippines	–	pressed	the	 Chun	 regime	 not	 to	 use	 armed	 force	 against	 protestors	 (Fowler,	 1999).	Therefore,	 the	 regime’s	 internal	 power	 struggle	 between	 the	 Hanahoe	 faction	and	 non-Hanahoe	 officers	 was	 finally	 settled	 in	 June	 1987,	 when	 Chun	 Doo-hwan’s	 right	 hand-man,	 Roh	 Tae-woo,	 publicly	 promised	 to	 concede	 to	 the	opposition’s	demands	for	constitutional	reforms.	To	 sum	 up,	 the	 state	 provided	 the	 military-bureaucratic	 regime	 with	 a	formidable	 set	of	 coercive	 instruments.	However,	 as	 the	opposition	movement	grew	 in	 strength,	 regime	 elites	 repeatedly	 clashed	 over	 how	 to	 employ	 these	instruments,	with	–	at	times	–	far-reaching	consequences	for	regime	stability.	In	1979,	intra-regime	struggles	resulted	in	the	assassination	of	Park	Chung-hee,	yet	not	 in	 the	democratization	of	 the	political	 system.	On	 the	other	hand,	 in	1987,	with	 the	 US	 siding	 with	 reform-oriented	 non-Hanahoe	 groupings,	 internal	divisions	 created	 a	 path	 to	 democratic	 reform.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 in	 the	 end,	 a	combination	 of	 three	 factors	 made	 it	 impossible	 to	 run	 the	 state’s	 coercive	apparatus	at	full	capacity:	increasing	pressure	from	‘below’,	deepening	factional	
	divisions	within	the	regime,	and	withdrawal	of	support	for	the	dominant	faction	by	the	US	government.	
 
Co-optation As	discussed	in	the	introduction	to	this	special	issue,	elections	may	provide	an	 important	 mechanism	 for	 elite	 co-optation.	 In	 particular,	 if	 the	 regime	succeeds	 in	winning	 supermajorities	 this	 signals	 that	 opposition	 is	 futile,	 thus	creating	disincentives	 for	elites	 to	defect.	However,	at	 the	same	time,	elections	are	ambivalent	institutions	that	can	undermine	a	dictator’s	hold	on	power	–	for	example,	by	providing	the	opposition	with	a	space	to	voice	their	grievances	and	by	 generating	 empowering	 spillover	 effects	 into	 other	 spheres	 of	 political	 life	(e.g.	Lindberg,	2006).		Park	Chung-hee,	seemingly	aware	of	these	risks,	initially	attempted	to	stall	the	re-introduction	of	elections	after	the	1961	coup.	However,	ultimately,	‘public	denunciation,	 demonstrations,	 and	 pressure	 from	 the	 United	 States’	 (Palais,	1974:	336)	forced	Park	to	agree	to	a	‘civilianization’	of	government	and	a	return	to	electoral	competition.		Park’s	concerns	about	the	re-introduction	of	elections	were	not	unfounded,	as	 the	military-bureaucratic	 regime	would	 never	 achieve	 anything	 close	 to	 an	electoral	supermajority,	at	 least	not	at	 the	aggregate	national	 level.	From	1963	until	1988,	the	regime	party’s	difference	in	vote	share	in	relation	to	the	second	largest	party	never	exceeded	17.9	percent	for	parliamentary	elections	and	10.5	percent	 for	 presidential	 elections;	 the	 average	 difference	 was	 8.9	 percent	 for	parliamentary	elections	and	7.1	percent	for	presidential	elections	(see	Figure	2).	It	 is	 thus	 not	 surprising	 that	 key	 parts	 of	 the	 1972	 Yushin	 constitution	 were	
	aimed	at	curbing	the	competitiveness	of	the	electoral	process.	Most	importantly,	the	Yushin	constitution	abolished	direct	presidential	elections	and	empowered	the	president	to	appoint	one-third	of	the	National	Assembly	members.	The	latter	provision	would	become	crucial	 in	the	1978	parliamentary	elections,	when	the	regime’s	 DRP	 received	 fewer	 votes	 than	 the	 main	 opposition	 party	 and	 only	managed	 to	 maintain	 its	 majority	 in	 the	 National	 Assembly	 due	 to	constitutionally	reserved	seats.	
 [Figure	2	about	here.]	
 The	regime’s	failure	to	produce	supermajorities	can	be	explained	in	part	by	the	limitations	 that	 the	 context	 imposed	 on	 using	 the	 developmental	 state	 for	electoral	purposes	–	either	to	organize	systematic	electoral	fraud	or	to	lock	the	electorate	into	a	clientelistic	exchange	agreement.	For	 one,	 the	 pro-democracy	movement	 –	 at	 least	 after	 Park	 Chung-hee’s	meddling	with	the	constitution	in	1969	had	galvanized	opposition	to	autocratic	rule	 (Im,	 2011:	 243)	 –	 was	 relatively	 unified	 and	 possessed	 the	 ability	 to	coordinate	 large-scale	 collective	 action.	 According	 to	 the	 theoretical	 literature	on	electoral	fraud	(e.g.	Magaloni,	2010),	such	a	set-up	makes	the	manipulation	of	elections	 a	 risky	 strategy	 for	 autocratic	 regimes,	 as	 it	 may	 backfire	 and	 fuel	public	protests	against	stolen	elections.	In	fact,	it	seems	that	these	were	exactly	the	 strategic	 calculations	 that	 underlay	 the	 regime’s	 decision	 to	 refrain	 from	engaging	in	systematic	electoral	fraud.	As	Kim	and	Koh	(1972:	857-858)	explain	in	 their	 case	 study	 of	 the	 1971	 election,	 the	 regime	was	 ‘keenly	 aware	 of	 […]	possible	 boomerang	 effects.’	 The	 DRP	 thus	 ‘warned	 its	 candidates	 for	 the	
	National	 Assembly	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 ‘election	 controversies’	 and	 publicly	declared	 that	 the	 party	would	 deal	most	 severely	with	 anyone	 found	 guilty	 of	election	 fraud.’	Consequently,	 rather	 than	employing	 the	developmental	 state’s	administrative	and	coercive	capabilities	to	organize	electoral	fraud,	the	military-bureaucratic	regime	relied	on	the	state	apparatus	to	prevent	electoral	fraud.	This	is	reflected	 in	 the	significant	decline	of	election	campaign	violations	over	 time,	especially	after	the	implementation	of	the	draconian	Yushin	constitution	in	1972	(Lee,	1999:	60).	Moreover,	not	only	did	the	structural	context	place	limitations	on	the	use	of	 the	 state	 for	 electoral	 manipulation,	 but	 it	 also	 constrained	 the	 military-bureaucratic	 regime	 in	 drawing	 on	 the	 state	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	clientelistic	 punishment	 mechanism.	 As	 outlined	 earlier,	 successful	industrialization	 gave	 rise	 to	 growing	 urban	 middle	 and	 working	 classes.	Confirming	theoretical	expectations	regarding	the	effectiveness	of	clientelism	as	an	electoral	strategy	(e.g.	Lyne,	2007),	these	groups	were	difficult	to	mobilize	on	the	basis	of	clientelistic	appeals.	To	some	extent,	this	showed	in	national	voting	patterns:	 before	 electoral	 reform	 in	 1972	 –	 which	 was	 precisely	 aimed	 at	improving	the	regime’s	electoral	performance	in	urban	districts	–	the	DRP	only	succeeded	 in	winning	 an	 average	 of	 28.4	 percent	 of	 urban	 seats,	 while	 at	 the	same	time	winning	an	average	of	78.1	percent	of	rural	seats	(Lee,	1999:	55).5		In	 rural	 areas,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 regime’s	 clientelistic	 punishment	mechanism	 worked	 very	 efficiently.	 Moreover,	 and	 most	 importantly	 for	 the	discussion	 here,	 the	 state’s	 administrative	 apparatus	 played	 a	 critical	 role	 in	operating	the	clientelistic	punishment	mechanism.	In	particular,	the	Ministry	for	Home	Affairs	(MHA)	–	with	its	‘power	to	affect	almost	all	facets	of	everyday	life	
	in	 the	 countryside’	 –	 and	 the	 National	 Agricultural	 Cooperative	 Federation	(NACF),	which	was	famers’	only	source	of	credit,	marketing,	and	fertilizer,	were	key	cogs	in	the	clientelistic	machine	(Lee,	2011:	348-349).		Yet,	 ultimately,	 the	 successful	 functioning	 of	 the	 clientelistic	 punishment	mechanism	 depended	 on	 it	 being	 fueled	 by	 sufficient	 government	 resources.	Under	 the	Park	 regime,	 this	was	 consistently	ensured	–	 in	particular,	 after	 the	launch	 of	 the	 Saemaŭl	 (New	 Village)	 program	 in	 1970.	 The	 Chun	 regime,	however,	which	came	to	power	in	the	midst	of	the	1979-80	economic	crisis,	cut	down	on	subsidies	to	rural	sectors	(such	as	the	grain	management	fund	and	the	fertilizer	 account)	 as	 part	 of	 its	 wider	 strategy	 to	 ensure	 macroeconomic	stability.	The	result	was	declining	support	for	the	regime	and	a	strengthening	of	opposition	groups	in	rural	areas	(see	Haggard	and	Moon,	1993:	87).			
 
Conclusion 	In	 principle,	 a	 high-capacity	 state	 provides	 authoritarian	 regimes	 with	 a	powerful	 tool	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 stability-enhancing	 strategies:	 high-capacity	states	can	bolster	the	regime’s	 legitimation	through	the	mechanism	of	economic	 development;	 high-capacity	 states	 provide	 an	 effective	 security	apparatus	 for	 the	 repression	 of	 dissent;	 and	 high-capacity	 states	 can	 help	 the	regime	 secure	 electoral	 supermajorities,	 thereby	 facilitating	 the	 co-optation	 of	actual	and	potential	elite	rivals.	However,	 as	 the	 case	 study	 of	 electoral	 authoritarianism	 in	 Korea	demonstrates,	 state	 capacity	 does	 not	 automatically	 translate	 into	 regime	
	resilience:	 the	military-bureaucratic	 regime	controlled	a	state	characterized	by	exceptionally	high	levels	of	infrastructural	capacity,	yet	was	eventually	forced	to	concede	to	demands	for	democratic	reform.		More	 specifically,	 what	 the	 case	 study	 of	 Korea’s	 military-bureaucratic	regime	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 electoral	 authoritarianism	 is	 an	enhanced	understanding	of	how	the	state’s	capacity	to	 implement	strategies	of	regime	 stabilization	 depends	 on	 its	 contextual	 embedding.	 Based	 on	 an	analytical	 framework	 that	 synthesized	work	 from	 various	 literatures,	 the	 case	study	produced	a	number	of	significant	findings.		First,	 state	 capacity	 is	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 determined	 by	 the	 state’s	 social	context.	For	one,	the	more	affluent	society,	the	more	difficult	autocratic	leaders	will	 find	 it	 to	 use	 the	 state	 to	 establish	 a	 clientelistic	 punishment	 regime	 as	 a	means	to	mobilize	electoral	support.	Moreover,	the	stronger	society	–	that	is,	the	better	 organized	 social	 groups	 are	 –	 the	 more	 difficult	 it	 becomes	 to	 enforce	citizen	 compliance	 through	 the	 state’s	 coercive	 apparatus.	 Similarly,	 a	 more	unified	 and	 better	 organized	 opposition	 means	 that	 employing	 the	 state	 to	perpetrate	systematic	electoral	fraud	becomes	a	very	risky	strategy.	In	other	words,	a	high-capacity	state	can	be	a	double-edged	sword.	On	the	one	 hand,	 strong	 states	 can	 help	 autocratic	 regimes	 to	 generate	 legitimation	through	 their	 ability	 to	 coordinate	 economic	 development;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	social	change	spawned	by	economic	growth	can	 lead	to	a	decline	 in	 the	state’s	repressive	capacity	and	its	ability	to	mobilize	electoral	supermajorities.	Second,	 not	 only	 is	 state	 capacity	 a	 function	 of	 the	 state’s	 infrastructural	power	and	its	social	embedding,	but	it	also	depends	on	the	international	context.	As	 the	 case	 study	 of	 Korea’s	 military-bureaucratic	 regime	 has	 shown,	 the	
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																																																									1	For	the	sake	of	this	paper,	we	define	the	developmental	state	primarily	by	its	institutional	properties.	Specifically,	as	Leftwich	(1995,	420)	highlights,	developmental	states	‘concentrate	considerable	power,	authority,	autonomy	and	competence	in	the	central	political	and	bureaucratic	institutions	of	the	state,	notably	their	economic	bureaucracies,	and	generate	pervasive	infrastructural	capacity’.	In	particular,	this	means	that	we	do	not	assume	that	developmental	states	have,	by	definition,	to	be	bolstered	by	autocratic	government	structures.	In	fact,	the	case	of	post-WWII	Japan	shows	that	developmental	states	can	coexist	with	democratic	regimes.	
2	At	this	point,	labor	protests	were	largely	spontaneous	and	localized,	aimed	at	improving	working	conditions	at	the	factory	level.	A	notable	exception	was	an	industry-wide	strike	among	textile	workers	in	1969.	
3	Noteworthy	examples	of	enhanced	working	class	capacity	in	the	run-up	to	Park	Chung-hee’s	assassination	include	the	Dong-Il	Textile	strike	(1976-1978)	and	the	so-called	‘YH	incident’	(1979).	Labor	activism	then	reemerged	in	the	mid-1980s	with	the	ability	to	organize	even	more	sophisticated	acts	of	civil	disobedience,	such	as	strikes	at	Chonggye	Garments	(1984),	Daewoo	Automobiles	(1985)	and	Kurodong	Industrial	Estates	(1985).	
4	These	student	demonstrations	were	themselves	a	response	to	arbitrary	and	cruel	actions	by	the	Park	regime	–	most	notably,	the	violent	break-up	of	a	protest	by	female	workers	at	a	wig	factory,	which	resulted	in	the	death	of	one	worker	(‘YH	incident’),	and	the	dislodging	of	the	NDP	leader,	Kim	Young-sam,	from	parliament.	
5	Electoral	reform	replaced	the	single-member	plurality	system	with	single	non-transferable	vote	(SNTV).	The	regime’s	calculation	was	that	SNTV’s	two-member	districts	would,	in	urban	areas,	result	in	an	equal	allocation	of	seats	between	the	DRP	and	the	main	opposition	party,	rather	than	the	latter	winning	the	majority	of	seats.	
